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Abstract
People act upon their desires, but often, also act in adherence
to implicit social norms. How do people infer these unstated
social norms from others’ behavior, especially in novel so-
cial contexts? We propose that laypeople have intuitive the-
ories of social norms as behavioral constraints shared across
different agents in the same social context. We formalize in-
ference of norms using a Bayesian Theory of Mind approach,
and show that this computational approach provides excellent
predictions of how people infer norms in two scenarios. Our
results suggest that people separate the influence of norms and
individual desires on others’ actions, and have implications for
modelling generalizations of hidden causes of behavior.
Keywords: Social Norms; Social Cognition; Bayesian Theory
of Mind; Intuitive Theories
Introduction
Imagine entering a cafeteria in a foreign country that you
know little about. There are but a handful of individuals in
the cafeteria; you notice a tray-return receptacle at the far end,
but you do not notice any signage on the walls detailing the
expectations governing tray returns. If you observe someone
carry their tray to the far end in order to return it, what in-
ferences might you make? Does that person like returning
trays, incurring the cost of walking across the room to do so?
Or, is there an implicit social norm at play? A second person
leaves without returning their tray. What might you now in-
fer about them or about the potential social norm? Lastly, a
third person approaches the second and loudly chastises them
for not returning their tray, what would you then infer about
everybody’s preferences and the social factors at play?
Social norms are ubiquitous features of human societies,
and as the example above suggests, we are able to rapidly in-
fer their presence in novel situations. Children as young as
three (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016) demon-
strate the ability to learn and generalize these rules of social
behavior (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). Not surprisingly, this
ability continues into adulthood, allowing us, for example,
to travel to new countries and then learn through observing
others whether one is obliged to tip at restaurants, what the
appropriate manner of greeting is, or what topics of conver-
sation are considered impolite. In other words, we seem to
possess not just an intuitive Theory of Mind (ToM) which al-
lows us to infer the beliefs and desires of individuals, but also
a corresponding ability to efficiently make inferences about
shared norms that drive behavior across individuals. Further-
more, we appear naturally capable of disentangling the in-
fluence of social norms and individual desires: when we see
someone picking up trash on the sidewalk, we infer that this
is more likely due to an obligation to keep the streets clean
rather than enjoyment of the act itself.
Despite (or perhaps because of) its ubiquity, how people
infer social normativity is relatively understudied. The philo-
sophical literature on social norms has generally focused on
characterizing the precise nature of such norms—whether
they are best understood as social practices, preferences con-
ditioned upon shared expectations of behavior, or commonly-
held normative attitudes (Bicchieri, 2005; Brennan, Eriks-
son, Goodin, & Southwood, 2013). Across philosophy, eco-
nomics and psychology, there has also been an emphasis upon
understanding the conditions and mechanisms for the emer-
gence of norms (Hawkins, Goodman, & Goldstone, 2018)—
whether they arise, for example, as Nash equilibria (Axelrod,
1986; Young, 2015), correlated equilibria (Gintis, 2010),
or through maximization of cultural values (Bo¨lo¨ni, Bhatia,
Khan, Streater, & Fiore, 2018). Other studies investigate how
norms influence decision making (Chang & Sanfey, 2011),
and how they are enforced (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). How-
ever, apart from a few simulation-based studies (Savarimuthu,
Cranefield, Purvis, & Purvis, 2010; Cranefield, Meneguzzi,
Oren, & Savarimuthu, 2016), research into how social norms
are inferred remains scarce.
How then to explain our ability to infer social norms?
In recent years, Bayesian models of cognition have begun
to establish a computational basis for how people make so-
cial inferences. The Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) ap-
proach is perhaps the most prominent example, allowing re-
searchers to formalize how people make graded judgments
about unobservable mental states by observing the actions
of others (Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017).
This approach to social cognition has been extended to model
reasoning about others’ emotions (Ong, Zaki, & Goodman,
2015), inferring others’ beliefs and desires from observed ac-
tions and emotional expressions (Wu, Baker, Tenenbaum, &
Schulz, 2018), reasoning about how others balance costs and
rewards in deciding how to act (Jara-Ettinger, Gweon, Schulz,
& Tenenbaum, 2016), learning how people value the welfare
of others (Kleiman-Weiner, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017), and
inferring the presence of co-operation or competition from
the behavior of multiple individuals (Shum, Kleiman-Weiner,
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Littman, & Tenenbaum, 2019). Related work modelling hu-
man concept learning as Bayesian rule inference (Goodman,
Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008) has also been used
to develop theories of why people tend to learn act-based
moral rules rather than outcome-based ones (Nichols, Kumar,
Lopez, Ayars, & Chan, 2016).
We build upon this tradition of computational cognitive
modelling, and hypothesize that people intuitively understand
social norms as factors of behavioral influence which are
shared across agents in a particular social context. These
shared norms influence behavior alongside the individual de-
sires of agents, and can generally be understood as injunc-
tions or constraints on behavior, i.e., they prescribe, recom-
mend, or prohibit certain kinds of actions1. We propose that
people include these norms in their lay theories of social be-
havior, and we model these theories as Bayesian networks
which include both norms and desires as possible causes of
action. Judgments about the presence of a norm can thus
be modelled using Bayesian inference conditioned upon ob-
served actions, which can be made alongside desire infer-
ences. Furthermore, since social norms are shared, inferences
about them can be made from observations of multiple agents,
unlike those for desires. We discuss several of these models,
each of which captures a plausible intuitive theory of how
norms influence both desires and actions. We then describe
an experiment to test which model provides the best explana-
tion of lay people’s judgments in two social scenarios.
Computational Models
In order to study how people make inferences about social
norms given observations of behavior, we choose to model
situations where norm-driven actions are likely to be salient.
In such situations, agents can take the role of actors, who are
in the position to comply with a potentially applicable norm,
or they can take the role of judges, who are in the position to
enforce that norm after observing non-compliance. For sim-
plicity, we restrict ourselves to the smallest multi-agent set-
ting, with only one actor and one judge. The actor takes an ac-
tion A1, which corresponds to compliance or non-compliance
with a potential norm. We also assume that the actor has some
latent (binary) desire D1 over action A1 and its associated out-
come. If the actor decides not to comply with the norm, the
judge may take an action A2, which corresponds to enforce-
ment or non-enforcement of the potential norm. The judge
also has a (binary) desire D2 over the space of outcomes of
A1 (note however that D2 is conditionally independent of A1,
since the judge’s desires exist whether or not A1 is taken).
D2 influences the enforcement action A2 because A2 can rec-
tify the outcome produced by A1. We denote the norm by N,
which either exists (N = 1) or does not (N = 0) in the mod-
elled situation.
1Here we are not interested in modelling descriptive norms—
statistical regularities—since they can be directly learned through
observation, though it is an interesting but separate research question
as to how people might infer injunctive norms from descriptive ones.
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Figure 1: Possible intuitive causal models of how social
norms influence behavior. We consider two agents, an Actor
(on the left of each model, with nodes in yellow) and a Judge
(on the right, with nodes in green). In Model FC, norms in-
fluence desires, and both norms and desires jointly influence
actions. In Model JE, desires are independent of norms, while
in Model DM, desires are the sole mediators of norms upon
behavior.
We consider three plausible models of laypeople’s intu-
itive theories of norm-driven behavior (Fig. 1). In the Fully
Connected (FC) model, we posit that social norms influence
the desires of each agent, reflecting the idea that norms can
be (partly) internalized, such that norm compliance becomes
part of one’s desire. We also assume that norms and desires
jointly affect an agent’s actions. This corresponds to the no-
tion that whether or not a norm is internalized, it continues to
directly influence actions, whether by imposing an expected
social cost to non-compliance, or simply by having a norma-
tive force that is separate of individual desire.
In our second candidate model, the Joint Effect (JE)
model, desires and norms still jointly influence actions, but
agent desires are independent of norms. That is, lay people’s
notions of what agents ‘want’ to do are separate from what
they ‘should’ do, mapping roughly to the Kantian distinction
between desire and duty. Lastly, the Desire Mediation (DM)
model assumes that norms do not influence actions directly,
but only when mediated by desires. This assumption corre-
sponds to the Humean notion that desires are the sole motives
for action—that ‘shoulds’ cannot influence action unless they
also become ‘wants’—a notion which might plausibly feature
in lay intuitions about norms. In addition to these three ‘com-
plete’ models, we also tested two lesioned models: a desire-
only model (D-only) and a norm-only model (N-only).
It is worth emphasizing that in proposing these models, we
are not attempting to give a rigorous philosophical account
of the relationship between norms, desires, and actions, nor
are we attempting to argue that social norms cannot be ex-
plained in terms of desires, or for that matter, other cognitive
variables such as shared beliefs or expectations. Rather, our
intention is to propose models of how people intuitively un-
derstand norms and norm-driven behavior.
Experiment
We conducted an experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (AMT) to elicit lay people’s likelihood judgments about
norms, desires and actions in two different social scenar-
ios: one involving an obligative norm—the norm that people
should return their trays after eating—and another involving
a prohibitive norm—the norm that people should not litter.
Given widespread intuitive acceptance of the act-omission
distinction (Kahneman & Sunstein, 2005), we expected that
people might also respond differently to obligations and pro-
hibitions. We also chose common, but not universal, social
norms, so that we could better observe how people adjusted
their certainty about the existence of each norm.
Methods
We provide a sample of our experiment, our data, and analysis
code at https://github.com/ztangent/norms-cogsci19.
Scenario Structure. Both scenarios were identical in
structure—participants were introduced to an actor in a posi-
tion to comply with a potentially applicable norm, and asked
to make various likelihood judgments. They were then shown
the actor not complying with the potential norm, introduced
to a judge who (unknown to the actor) had observed the ac-
tor’s action, and made another round of judgments.
Experimental Conditions. To measure how well our pro-
posed models predict lay people’s inferences, as well as deter-
mine which model best captures intuitions about norms, we
divided each each scenario into five conditions, each querying
for different sets of likelihood judgments:
A. Norm and desire priors, and desires given norms:
P(N), P(D1), P(D2), P(D1|N), P(D2|N).
B. Actions conditioned on desires only: P(A1|D1), P(A2|D2).
C. Actions conditioned on norms only: P(A1|N), P(A2|N).
D. Actions conditioned on both: P(A1|D1,N), P(A2|D2,N).
E. Norm and desire posteriors:
P(D1|A1), P(D2|A1,A2), P(N|A1), P(N|A1,A2)
Data from conditions A–D were used both to calibrate the
models and to investigate people’s intuitions about the rela-
tionship between norms, desires and actions, e.g., by com-
paring P(D1|N) (condition B) to P(D1) (condition A) to see
if people judge desires to be dependent upon norms. After
calibrating the models, data from condition E was compared
against the models’ posterior inferences to see if they pre-
dicted participants’ inferences about norms and desires.
Participants. We recruited 200 US participants (mean age
35.6, SD 11.2; 104 male, 95 female, 1 unreported) via AMT,
restricting to those with a HIT approval rate of 99% and
above. All participants went through both scenarios in ran-
dom order, and each participant was randomly assigned to a
different condition within each scenario (i.e. assigned condi-
tions for Scenario 1 and 2 were independent). For Scenario 1,
conditions 1A through 1E, sample sizes were n =51, 24, 25,
51 and 49 respectively. For Scenario 2, conditions 2A through
2E, sample sizes were n =49, 25, 25, 50 and 51 respectively.
Assuming a large effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.5), these sam-
ple sizes give > 93% power for one-way ANOVA between
sub-conditions at the 5% significance level (e.g. comparing
P(A1|N=1) and P(A1|N=0) in condition C).
Scenario 1: An Obligative Norm
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Return tray
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?
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Bailey
Casey
? Ask Bailey to
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(b) Judge’s choices
Figure 2: Returning one’s tray as an obligative social norm.
Details. Participants were presented with a vignette with
two phases, with text descriptions accompanied by illustra-
tions. In the first phase (Figure 2(a)), Bailey, the actor, has
finished a meal served on a tray in a restaurant. The restau-
rant has a tray return station, and Bailey can choose to either
return (A1 =1) or leave (A1 =0) the tray. Since the norm at
play was obligative (’People should return their trays after
eating.’), A1 =1 corresponds to compliance with the norm (if
it exists, i.e, if N =1). In the second phase, participants are
told that Bailey decides to leave the tray, and are introduced to
Casey, who, unknown to Bailey, has watched this occur (Fig-
ure 2(b)). Casey now has the option of either asking Bailey
to return the tray (A2 =1) or saying nothing (A2 =0), where
A2 =1 corresponds to enforcement of the potential norm.
Questions were presented after each phase was introduced,
asking participants to make judgments depending on the con-
dition they were assigned. When queried for priors (condition
A), participants were directly asked how likely they thought
a certain state of affairs was true (e.g. ”How likely do you
think Casey wants the tray to be returned?” for P(D2), ”How
likely do you think the following norm exists?” for P(N)).
When queried for conditional likelihoods, including the pos-
teriors, participants were first asked to suppose a certain state
of affairs (e.g. ”If you saw Casey ask Bailey to return the
tray,” for P(·|A1=0,A2=1) or ”Suppose that Bailey does not
want to return the tray.” for P(·|D1 = 0)), and then asked to
give likelihood judgments given those suppositions. To make
these counterfactuals more concrete in the case of the poste-
rior inferences (condition E), we also provided corresponding
illustrations of the counterfactual actions.
Results. To determine if participants intuitively judged de-
sires to be independent of norms, we first analyzed the data
from condition A to see if P(Di), P(Di|N =1) and P(Di|N =
0) (i ∈ {1,2}) exhibited significant differences. As can be
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Figure 3: Scenario 1 Results. (a) Empirical norm and desire judgments from condition 1A. (b) Empirical action likelihoods,
from condition 1D. (c) Comparing empirical posteriors from condition 1E with posterior judgments from our proposed models.
seen in 3(a), this was indeed the case, with one-way ANOVA
giving F(2,150) = 55.13, p < 0.001, for the actor’s condi-
tional and prior desires (D1), and F(2,150) = 66.95, p <
0.001, for the judge’s (D2) conditional and prior desires. This
provides evidence against Model JE, which assumes that de-
sires are independent of norms.
Next, to determine if desires and norms jointly influence
behavior, we analyzed the conditional action likelihoods from
condition D. As Figure 3(b) shows, given a fixed value of de-
sire, there were significant differences between action like-
lihoods when the norm was either absent or present (all ts
> 5.77, all ps < 0.001, df= 50, paired test). That is, re-
gardless of whether the agent wanted to act, the presence
of the tray-return norm (N = 1) led people to judge both
norm compliance (A1 = 1) and norm enforcement (A2 = 1)
as more likely. This provides evidence against Model DM,
which assumes norms have no direct effect on actions. (For
brevity, we omit comparisons between P(Ai|Di,N), P(Ai|Di)
and P(Ai|N), i ∈ {1,2} using the data from conditions B and
C, but these display significant differences as well.)
Finally, we computed the desire and norm posteriors un-
der the FC, JE and DM models, then compared them against
participants’ posterior judgements, as shown in Figure 3(c).
All three models displayed high correlation with the empiri-
cal data (FC: r=0.944, JE: r=0.974, DM: r=0.981). The
correlations of the lesioned models were worse by compar-
ison (D-only: r = 0.944, N-only: r = 0.384). Both norm
and desire posteriors increased when compliance (A1 =1) or
enforcement (A2 = 1) were observed, and decreased other-
wise. The three models also captured people’s ability to in-
tegrate information across multiple agents to infer the pres-
ence of norms—when non-compliance by the actor (A1 =0)
is observed, the likelihood of the norm’s existence decreases
(P(N) > P(N|A1 = 0)), but when enforcement by the judge
(A2) is subsequently observed, the likelihood of the norm in-
creases again (P(N|A1 =0)< P(N|A1 = 0,A2 =1)).
Despite the desire and action likelihoods providing strong
evidence against the JE and DM models, these models
were surprisingly more correlated with participants’ posterior
judgements than the FC model. The results for Scenario 1 are
thus hard to interpret conclusively. Plausibly, this was due
the high degree of inter-subject variance in likelihood ratings,
suggesting that people’s intuitive models of social normativ-
ity have substantial heterogeneity.
Scenario 2: A Prohibitive Norm
Avery
Hold on and
keep walking
Toss on
the ground
?
(a) Actor’s choices
Darcy
Continue
walking
Ask Avery
to pick it up
?
Avery
(b) Judge’s choices
Figure 4: Not littering as a prohibitive social norm.
Details. As in Scenario 1, participants were presented with
a two-phase vignette. In the first phase (Figure 4(a)), Avery,
the actor, is walking along a city street while holding on to
some crumpled paper. Avery can choose to either toss the pa-
per (A1 =1) or continue holding on (A1 =0). Since the norm
at play was prohibitive (’People should not discard their be-
longings on the ground.’), A1 =1 corresponds to violation of
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Figure 5: Scenario 2 Results. Figure is similar to Fig. 3 except for the fact that Scenario 2 involved a prohibitive norm, where
A1 = 1 (littering) contravenes the norm. This explains the different patterns for the likelihood of Actor variables (D1, A1).
the norm, unlike in Scenario 1. In the second phase, partici-
pants are told that Avery decides to toss the crumpled paper
on the ground, and are introduced to Darcy, who, unknown
to Avery, has watched this occur (Figure 4(b)). Darcy now
has the option of either asking Avery to pick up the crumpled
paper (A2=1) or saying nothing (A2=0), where again A2=1
corresponds to enforcement of the potential norm. After each
phase was introduced, participants were asked to make like-
lihood judgments depending on the condition they were as-
signed, using the same question formats as in Scenario 1.
Results. First, we analyzed the data from condition A to see
if participants judged desires to be norm-dependent. As 5(a)
shows, this was once more the case, with one-way ANOVA
giving F(2,144) = 18.02, p < 0.001, for the actor’s condi-
tional and prior desires (D1), and F(2,144) = 35.86, p <
0.001, for the judge’s (D2) conditional and prior desires. We
then analyzed the conditional action likelihoods from condi-
tion D, and found similarly that there were significant dif-
ferences when the norm was either absent or present (all ts
> 3.10, all ps < 0.005, df=49, paired test). To be clear, the
influence of the norm here was in the opposite direction—
N=1 led to littering (A1 =1) being less likely.
Lastly, we computed the desire and norm posteriors under
the various models and compared against the empirical data,
as shown in Figure 5(c). Compared to Scenario 1, more pro-
nounced differences could be observed between models. In
particular, Model DM significantly over-estimates the norm’s
likelihood when a norm-violating or non-enforcing action is
taken (see Figure 5(c) P(N|A1 = 1), P(N|A1 = 1,A2 = 0)),
because it attributes the cause of the action primarily to the
desire not to comply with or enforce the norm. In contrast,
Model FC better predicts that the norm’s likelihood should
decrease when norm violation is observed. This is because
there are multiple causal pathways that lead from the norm
to the actions in Model FC—norm-violating actions directly
imply that the norm is unlikely to exist, but they also im-
ply that the desire for the norm-violating action exists, which
indirectly implies the non-existence of the norm. Model JE
over-estimates the norm’s likelihood slightly less than Model
DM, but still more than Model FC, because it has only one
causal pathway from the norm to the action.
Nonetheless, all three models still correlated highly with
the data (FC: r = 0.934, JE: r = 0.887, DM: r = 0.828),
and the lesioned models again performed worse (D-only:
r = 0.772, N-only: r = 0.461). Both norm and desire like-
lihoods increased when compliance (A1 =0) or enforcement
(A2 =1) were observed, and decreased otherwise. We simi-
larly observed that people integrated information from multi-
ple agents: the likelihood of the norm decreases after observ-
ing norm violation (P(N|A1=1)< P(N)), but increases again
after subsequently observing enforcement (P(N|A1 = 1,A2 =
1)> P(N|A1 =1)).
Unlike in Scenario 1, Model FC displayed the highest de-
gree of correlation out of our three proposed models. This,
combined with the analysis showing that both actions and de-
sires are directly norm-dependent, provide strong evidence
for model FC over the other two models. One reason this
might have been the case for Scenario 2 is that a prohibitive
norm tends to conflict with the direction of desire—people are
more likely to act how they believe they should, whatever they
happen to want for themselves. This would disfavor Model
DM (hence its over-estimation of the norm’s likelihood) but
favor Model FC, because it betters captures the restraining
effect of norms on both desires and actions.
General Discussion
We experimentally investigated how laypeople infer norms
from behavior, and showed that a Bayesian model provides
excellent predictions of people’s posterior inferences of both
obligative and prohibitive norms. We tested several plausible
theories, and found strong evidence that people understand
norms to directly influence both desires and actions. This
suggested that the JE and DM models should be ruled out,
leaving the FC model. While our analysis of the model’s pos-
terior inferences in Scenario 1 did not unambiguously sup-
port this conclusion, the corresponding analysis for Scenario
2 did so, with the FC model showing the highest correla-
tion when averaged across both scenarios (FC: r=0.939, JE:
r = 0.931, DM: r = 0.905). Furthermore, comparison with
lesioned models showed that accurate inferences cannot be
made by omitting either desires on norms.
Our results lend support to our hypothesis that people un-
derstand social norms as behavioral constraints shared across
agents, in contrast to preferences that are idiosyncratic to in-
dividual agents. In this way, people are able to observe dif-
ferent actions made by individuals in different roles, integrat-
ing that information and allowing them to rapidly make infer-
ences about the presence of social norms in a given context.
This ability is highly useful, for it allows us navigate unfamil-
iar social environments without deducing the preferences of
every stranger about how one should act.
Of course, not all environments are unfamiliar—people
spend their whole lives with a familiar set of norms. Thus,
one might expect a person to bring strong expectations to bear
when making inferences about norms in a new, but familiar,
situation. Indeed, this was the case for many participants in
our experiment—while we constructed scenarios with com-
mon but not universal norms, participants were often certain
that the norm in question was present, even before observing
any actions. These priors made it harder for our experiment
to detect whether people deemed a norm more likely to exist
after observing norm compliance, but made it easier to detect
when people deemed a norm less likely to exist after observ-
ing a norm violation. Future experiments should introduce
participants to a more alien environment where they have no
sense of what the norms might be, and see if they can infer
the presence of a norm through a few observations.
Participants not only came in with varied priors, but also
varied likelihood judgements, with some participants giving
more weight to the influence of norms than others. This het-
erogeneity may help explain why our results for Scenario
1 were not conclusive—participants’ internal models might
have diverse parameters, and some might even have different
model structures altogether. As such, while the results clearly
showed that the models predicted average judgments with
high correlation, the ability to distinguish the exact model
type may have been lost. Still, it is interesting that even with
such diversity, people are still able to rapidly learn and con-
verge upon the same set of norms. How exactly this conver-
gence occurs is a topic worth exploring further.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a principled, compu-
tational framework for how people infer the shared drivers of
behavior that we call social norms. In addition, our results
give us insight into people’s intuitive theories of norms as in-
fluencing both our desires and our actions. This builds upon
previously studied models that infer the beliefs, desires, and
intentions of single agents, extending their inferential capac-
ity to large groups of agents constrained by shared context.
By laying the groundwork for how we make these inferences,
our work elucidates one way in which we make sense of the
full richness of social life—and how we ought to live it.
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